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Public Law 99-661 requires that the Department of
Defense (DOD) use Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) for resource
allocation.
DRGs are an attempt to identify outputs of a hospital's
inpatient care system that consume similar amounts of
resources. These outputs are clinically significant in that
they are composed of similar discharge diagnoses.
Rates of reimbursement for DRGs, are predicated on the
isoresource consumption nature of DRGs. The Federal
government has established DRGs as the basis of a prospec-
tive reimbursement rate structure. Several state adminis-
tered programs have also adopted this reimbursement policy.
By establishing an expected rate of reimbursement, the
paying agency has effectively provided hospitals an
incentive to control costs.
This study delves into the factors surrounding the
development and use of DRGs. Considered are the political
and legislative environment and its effect on the healthcare
industry, the history and applications of case-mix manage-
ment approaches and factors that will determine the success
of transference of case-mix management to DOD.
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Public Law 99-661 requires that the Department of
Defence (DOD) use Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) for
resource allocation. The law stipulated that in Fiscal Year
(FY) 1988 DRGs be the basis for allocation of resources for
inpatient care and that by FY 1989 DOD use a similar method
for allocating resources related to outpatient care.
DRGs are an attempt to identify outputs of a hospitals 's
inpatient care system that consume similar amounts of
resources. These outputs are clinically significant in that
they are composed of similar discharge diagnoses.
Rates of reimbursement for hospital outputs, DRGs, are
predicated on the isoresource consumption nature of DRGs.
The Federal government has established DRGs as the basis of
a prospective reimbursement rate structure. Several state
administered programs have also adopted this reimbursement
policy. By establishing an expected rate of reimbursement,
the paying agency has effectively provided hospitals an
incentive to control costs. Costs for providing care for a
DRG that are less than the rate reimbursed yield an increase
in hospital revenues. Conversely, costs for providing care
to a patient, that exceed the DRG reimbursement rate,
result in a loss the a hospital.
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The ability to respond to the incentives in a DRG
reimbursement system are predicated on the ability of
providers to take actions that will reduce the fixed and
variable costs of healthcare. These actions include
tradeoffs between manpower and capital, elimination of
unprofitable services and facility construction.
With the passage of P.L. 99-661, Congress has again
taken a direct role in shaping the national healthcare
system. This intervention is grounded in the escalating
costs of healthcare over the last thirty years.
What has the Federal government's role been in shaping
the healthcare industry in the last thirty years? Is it
possible to reconcile DOD ' s current information systems to
the requirements of DRG management? This has been the
thrust of this research effort.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objectives of this research were to:
1. Review the environment that has lead to the
establishment of competitive reimbursement struc-
tures, such as DRGs.
2. Review the methodologies that have been developed
for case-mix management.
3. Reconcile the current DOD healthcare system to the
requirements of case-mix management.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question is: Can DRGs be an
effective method of resource allocation and performance
evaluation for DOD?
Secondary questions are:
1. Why were DRGs developed?
2. How were DRGs developed?
3. What assumptions, regarding cost behavior and
management prerogatives are inherent in a DRG rate
structure?
4. Are these assumptions valid for DOD?
5. If necessary, what changes must be made within DOD to
meet the requirements to manage by DRGs?
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
This thesis is to delve into the factors surrounding the
development and use of DRGs. To be considered are the
political and legislative environment and its effect on the
healthcare industry, the history and applications of case-
mix management approaches and the factors that will
determine the success of transference of case-mix management
to DOD.
The author wishes to examine the behavior of national
healthcare costs over the last three decades, the major
pieces of legislation that have shaped the environment in
which the healthcare industry now operates, the assumptions
and methodologies used to create case-mix management
systems, such as DRGs, in order to meet the rigors of the
environment and the ability of DOD to adapt to case-mix
management systems. The purpose of the effort is to
evaluate the circumstances, within DOD, which must be
considered before DRGs can be used for resource allocation.





The research involved in the preparation of this thesis
was primarily archival in nature. Primary sources of
healthcare oriented research, reports on Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) research contracts,
telephone conversations with Army and Navy members of a DRG
implementation group and studies of federally managed and
funded hospitals served as the basis for this study.
In the areas of DRG determination and rate structure,
the experiences of the State of New Jersey, the forerunner
in DRG development and use, were of primary interest.
Because of the length of their experience base and the size
of the system of hospitals involved, New Jersey's experience
appeared to be more directly applicable to DOD.
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Because of the escalating costs of providing healthcare,
the Federal government has taken an increasingly active role
in creating a more competitive environment for hospitals and
other health care providers. The development and implemen-
tation of DRGs, as a reimbursement tool, at the state and
federal levels of government is the latest effort of
government to create incentives for providers of healthcare
to control costs.
Because of command, accounting and appropriation
structures, it will be an extensive task for DOD to develop
and fully implement the provisions of P.L. 99-661 and also
create the incentives for controlling costs that this law
intended.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II is a description of the literature reviewed
in undertaking this study. It provides a narrative of the
primary, pertinent journals and studies examined. The
sources of information are presented by major area of study.
Each area of study includes sources of information reviewed,
general nature of the information contained therein and its
pertinence.
Chapters III and IV provide comprehensive background
material germane to the major areas of study introduced in
Chapter II. It provides the basis from which the research
questions can be addressed.
The analysis and interpretation of the background
material presented in the previous chapter, as is applies to
the areas of research, is contained in Chapter V.
Chapter VI contains the conclusions and recommendations
that the author has formed as a result of this study.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. AVAILABLE LITERATURE
Recent and relevant literature, pertaining to case-mix
management, was reviewed in researching the issue of using
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) and Ambulatory Visit Groups
(AVG) for resource allocation. Topics included in this
review were the historical perspective of Congress and
healthcare, the definition of case-mix by DRG, use of
prospective payment by DRG to control healthcare costs,
implementation of payment by DRG in New Jersey, severity of
illness indexes and their use in refining DRGs and proposed
methods of grouping ambulatory visits.
Telephonic conversations with a Navy representative of
the DOD working group on DRG use and with Army health
systems staff working on DRG and AVG issues yielded
information on the status of DOD efforts to comply with P.L.
99-661. These individuals also confirmed what the author
considered to be major issues requiring resolution in order
to comply with both the letter and intent of P.L. 99-661 to
use DRGs and AVGs for resource allocation.
B. INVOLVEMENT OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE HEALTHCARE
SYSTEM
In order to assess the environment in which the United
States healthcare industry is operating, and into which the
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DOD healthcare sector is being pushed, articles, published
by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA),
Department of Health and Human Services, relating to
governmental entry into the healthcare industry through
Medicare and Medicaid programs, were consulted. This
literature examines the sociological and political reasons
for federal involvement, pertinent landmark legislation,
concerns with cost containment and efforts directed at the
healthcare industry to reduce cost growth.
C. DRG DEVELOPMENT
"Case Mix Definition by Diagnosis Related Groups", by
Robert B. Fetter, et. al. [Ref. 1] is considered the
definitive reference on DRG development. The work of the
Yale based group includes information concerning DRG
construction, interpretation of DRGs, utilization review
applications of DRG, case-mix accounting using DRGs, and DRG
use in regional planning for acute care hospitals.
Other efforts in case-mix definition, such as the Kaiser
Clinical Behavior Classification System were also reviewed.
These early efforts at finding clinically meaningful,
isoresource utilization groups, using available diagnostic
coding information, served to highlight the many patient
variables that can be considered in grouping categories of
hospital care.
These references explain the reasoning behind Case-mix
management. The aggregation of a multitude of individual
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discharge diagnoses into a manageable number of clinical and
isoresource consumption groups enables hospital managers and
paying agencies to establish meaningful measures of hospital
performance. With a definable output, standards of cost,
reimbursement and utilization can be developed and used in
making decisions regarding providing healthcare in an
economically rational manner.
D. SEVERITY OF ILLNESS
While ORGS have proven to be statistically significant,
clinically valid, classifications of resource use, the need
for refinement is recognized. Variations in resources
required in the treatment of a patient's illness due to the
severity of illness, stage of disease process or acuity of
nursing care required occur. Indexes of severity of illness
(SOI) for adjusting DRG reimbursement rates have been
proposed and methodologies defined. For a particular DRG, a
sicker patient will require more care than a less acutely
ill patient and reimbursement should reflect this.
R. H. Shachtman, et. al. [Ref. 2], Young [Ref. 3], and
S. D. Horn, et. al. [Ref. 4], reported on research of SOI
considerations. SOI indexing allows for the adjustment of
reimbursement rates for hospitalization based upon the
actual degree of illness exhibited by individual patients.
This attempts to provide fairness in reimbursement by
setting rates that are reflective of actual costs incurred.
E. DRG COST STRUCTURE
The basic tenet behind using DRGs for prospective
payment is to provide incentives for healthcare providers to
contain costs. By knowing up front, based on diagnosis,
what reimbursement will be for a patient, the institution
has reason to minimize the costs of that patient's care.
The provider will keep the difference between payment and
actual costs, if costs are less than payment or absorb the
loss, if costs exceed payment.
The behavior of costs and their allocation to DRG output
units is central to establishing DRG rates. The collection
of ancillary, routine care, general services, indirect and
capital costs and their allocation are the root of the
structure used to establish DRG reimbursement rates. R. H.
Davies and G. Westfall [Ref. 5] clearly outlined the
assumptions of cost behavior and allocation under the New
Jersey reimbursement system.
By setting up categories of cost collection pools and
assumptions of cost behavior for each category, the basis
for the calculation of hospital specific and statewide DRG
rates is established. This methodology could prove to be
useful in developing DRG rates for DOD.
F. AMBULATORY VISIT GROUPS
There is currently no generally accepted method for
grouping ambulatory visits. No single method of measuring
productivity or basing reimbursement by AVG has been
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implemented on a widespread basis. Various approaches to
developing AVGs have been proposed.
Under contract to the HCFA, Fetter [Ref. 6] has
developed ambulatory patient related groups based on
International Classification of Disease (ICDA-8) diagnoses.
This approach is essentially similar to the methodology used
to develop DRGs for inpatient care.
In attempting to group ambulatory care visits, consuming
similar resources, Rogerson, Stimson, Simborg and Charles
[Ref. 7] have proposed three methods of grouping. One
method is based on the problem presented by the patient.
The second approach is driven by major diagnostic category
and secondary diagnosis. The third approach is a simplified
version of the diagnosis based system. The data used in
developing these AVG systems is from a study at a hospital-
based primary care group at the San Francisco Veterans
Administration Medical Center from 1 January 1975 to 30 June
1980. Unique to these three approaches is that they
evaluate a patient's resource use over the period of one
year, not just for a single visit. This approach recognizes
that a single visit does not necessarily constitute a full
regime of ambulatory care for a given problem.
Using the patient's reason for visit as the primary
grouping variable, instead of diagnosis, D. Schneider [Ref.
8], makes a compelling argument that while inpatient care
is driven by admission diagnosis, ambulatory care is based
10
upon symptoms presented by the patient that may not result
in a diagnosis. it is not unusual to find that no disease
process is ever diagnosed before symptoms disappear.
G. USE OF ORGS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR FEDERALLY
OPERATED HOSPITALS
Preliminary results of a study by the Research Depart-
ment of the Naval School of Health Sciences, Research Paper
2-82 [Ref. 9], have validated the use of DRGs as a measure
of activity for Naval Hospitals. Additionally, this study
assessed the use of DRGs by the Great Lakes, Region IV, of
the Veterans Administration for resource allocation among
Naval Hospitals. The study concluded that current account-
ing systems and performance reporting systems used by the
Navy and DOD were inadequate to support resource allocation
by DRG. A patient level cost accounting system was required
to properly support this type of case-mix management. The
advantages of using DRGs to recognize case-mix differences
between medical activities and allocating resources
accordingly are noted in the study's conclusions.
H. SUMMARY
Using this information, the author has attempted to
trace the evolution of federal involvement in the healthcare
industry over the last thirty years. In order to understand
why government involvement has grown, a portion of this
retrospective look necessarily involved the review of the
origins and growth of Medicare and Medicaid. Out of these
11
programs and subsequent legislation and regulation relating
to them, have come the strategies to foster cost control
that DOD healthcare must now face. By understanding the
basis of case-mix management, its refinements and related
AVG proposals for managing outpatient care, the author was
better able to assess DOD ' s capability to change its method
of resource allocation for healthcare.
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. RISING COSTS OF HEALTHCARE
Over the past three decades, the costs of providing
healthcare in the United States have expanded dramatically.
As a percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) in 1950,
total expenditures on healthcare were 4.5 percent. By 1976,
8.6 percent of the United States GNP was being devoted to
healthcare. [Ref. 10:p. 203] In the past ten years, this
percentage has risen to and is at 11 percent of the GNP
devoted to our nation's healthcare.
Figure 1 illustrates the gap that has occurred between
the changes in health expenditures and the changes in the
GNP for the period 1951 through 1981. The growing gap
represents the movement of resources to the healthcare
sector from the general economy.
Table 1 helps place in perspective the enormity of the
increase in healthcare spending for the last thirty years in
terms of federal expenditures on health, national expendi-
tures on health and GNP. Even more importantly in this era
of concern over national debt and the related efforts to
reduce federal outlays, it is expressed in terms of federal












1 L i i .
950 I960 1970 1980
Figure 1 Difference Between Changes in Expendi-
tures on Health and Gross National
Product, 1951-1981 (Five Year Moving
Average)
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TABLE 1. FEI'EF.AL AHD NATIONAL EXPENDITURES ON HEALTH, TOTAL OUTLAYS
AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1960
(3-year averages centered on selected years'*
(Billions of 1983 dollars'
<i; Federal e::penditures 6 7 9 16 42 63 87
on health
{2)National expenditures 52 63 84 119 175 228 302
on health
(3.' Total federal outlays 170 248 295 359 463 547 695
<4>Gross national product l.l^S 1,404 1,589 2,015 2,369 2,686 3,224
(2) as percent of f4) 4.4 4.5 5.3 5.9 7.4 3.5 9.4
<1 as percent c: (2^ 12-5 11.2 11.2 13.4 24.2 27.6 28.7
<1 as oercent civ3> 3.8 29 3.2 4.4 9.2 11.5 12.5
Sources: Council of Economic Advisors, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 'GPO 1984', tables B- 1 , E-73; Gibson, R. M. and Levit, K. R.
.
"National Health Expenditures, 1982", HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW 5
<Fall 1983): table 1
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The largest component of this significant increase in
the price of healthcare was in the average hospital cost per
day. The average cost per patient day in 1950 was less than
$16, by 1976 it exceeded $151. [Ref. 10:p. 203] In terms
of the total expenditures per person on all hospital
services, expenditures increased from $25 in 1950, to $179
in 1973 (DHEW 1975), to $604 in 1983 (DHHS 1985).
This alarming rise in expenditures for hospital services
is significant, not only because of its magnitude, but also
for the percentage of the total healthcare expenditures it
represents. In 1950, hospital care represented 29.9 percent
of total national healthcare expenditures. This was 1.35
percent of GNP, approximately $3.8 billion. [Ref. ll:p. 41]
By 1983 these proportions had risen to over 40 percent and
4.5 percent respectively, representing $147 billion. [Ref.
12:p. 5]
There are several factors contributing to the overall
rise in healthcare expenditures. Among the contributing
causes are rising wage rates, facility costs, reimbursement
based on cost, scope of medical practice, general inflation,
supply costs and an increase in the size of the population.
From 1950 through 1967, population growth accounted for
18 percent of the overall increase in healthcare expendi-
tures, while increases in the costs of inputs and the
general inflation rate accounted for nearly half of the
increase. [Ref. ll:p. 42] The period 1972 to 1982 showed an
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expected decline in the effect of population growth to 6.9
percent/ while inputs and inflation, as measured by the GNP
deflator, accounted for 64.6 percent of the increase in
health care expenditures. [Ref. 13]
Other factors, such as intensity of care (the degree of
resources devoted to a course of treatment) and admissions
per capita, reflecting changes in the practice of medicine,
showed a decline from 33.9 percent for the period 1950 to
1967, to 28.5 percent of the increase in expenditures for
healthcare for the period 1972 to 1982. [Ref. 13]
The expenditures on hospital services, which have risen
to approximately 40 percent of all healthcare expenditures,
seem to have stabilized, as a proportion, since the early
1970s. A large portion of the increase that had occurred in
the area of hospital services, prior to 1970, is attribut-
able to rising wage rates. Hospitals, being a labor
intensive enterprise, typically experience 50 to 60 percent
of total costs in the area of labor.
In 1960, hospital employees earned only 68 percent of
the average hourly wage of production workers. This ratio
increased to 81 percent by 1969. [Ref. 14:pp. 62-72] In
addition, due to increasing the intensity of care and
expanding ancillary requirements in providing hospital
services, the employees per patient ratio for not-for-
profit, short-term hospitals increased from 1.91 in 1950 to
3.14 in 1973. (Hospital Statistics 1973) The number of
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people required to deliver the accepted standard of health
care increased and they were being paid better than before.
In 1968, 4 percent of hospital related costs were at-
tributable to construction (DHEW 1970) . Population growth
and increased emphasis on healthcare in a hospital setting
spurred the construction of new and larger physical plants.
Concurrently, advances in medical science and technology and
elevation of standards for hospital facilities added to the
cost and sizing requirements of hospital construction.
At the time these expansions of input costs for
hospitals were increasing, reimbursement to hospitals for
their services was based on their costs. Third parties,
including the Federal and State governments allowed
healthcare providers to pass along increased costs in their
prices. Without an incentive to minimize costs, hospitals
maintained their financial solvency by increasing revenues
through increases in prices.
B. INVOLVEMENT OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE HEALTHCARE
SYSTEM
1. The Need for Federally Managed Healthcare Programs
The expansion of healthcare expenditures, as
described, based upon an increasing population, increased
costs of inputs, and increased intensity of services, could
not long remain untouched by public concern.
The increasing role of the Federal government in
providing for the healthcare needs of the nation, from the
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early pre-Social Security programs aiding the blind,
disabled and aged, to the enactment of Medicare, Title XVIII
and Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social Security Act on 30
July 1965, has made the Federal government the leader in
cost containment efforts directed at the healthcare
industry.
More than one in five people, over 50 million, in
the United States are covered by either Medicare and/or
Medicaid. [Ref. 15:p. 20] By looking at these two programs,
their history, and changes in these programs to foster cost
containment, the environment into which DOD healthcare is
being directed can be understood.
Social pressures to improve access to healthcare,
to the aged, disabled and socially disadvantaged segments of
American society, spawned the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. Following World War II, a series of legislation
redefined the Federal-State roles in health policy and put
the Federal government in a role as a buyer of health
services. Prior to the Social Security Amendments of 1950,
1956, and 1960, medical assistance to the aged, disabled and
blind were largely within the purvey of disparate state
programs. Defying American Medical Association (AMA)
objections to federal intrusion into arrangements the AMA
supported with local governments. Medicare and Medicaid
established the Federal government as a player in the
physician/ hospital /pat lent relationship.
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The following excerpt from the AMA's testimony to
Congress provides, not only an appreciation of the opposi-
tion by healthcare professionals to the interjection of the
Federal government into healthcare policy, but also an
insight into what had been a backlash of de-Federalization
following the Roosevelt New Deal era.
The American Medical Association is vigorously and firmly
opposed to this step. First, we see no need for the
establishment of medical care as a fifth and separate
category of Federal aid in public assistance programs.
Pooling arrangements now available to the States under the
existing program can accomplish more flexibly and less
dangerously all the new proposals seek.
Second, such a new program would burden the community
with regulations and restrictions inconsistent with local
problems, local laws, or local customs. As an example,
amendments to the aid-to-blind program under the Social
Security Act have granted to optometrists since 1952 the
privilege of diagnosing pathological conditions of the
eye. This privilege, until 1952, had been uniformly
denied to them by state licensure laws.
Third, this section is totally inconsistent with the
philosophy heretofore underlying Federal participation in
public assistance programs. This philosophy, as expressed
in the other titles of the pending bills, presupposes that
Federal participation in such programs is a temporary
expedient, necessary only because the old age and
survivors benefits are not yet sufficiently matured to
furnish the basic protection required. As the old age and
survivors benefits mature, it has always been supposed
that Federal participation in public assistance would be
reduced. The medical provisions of the pending bills
represent an expansion in Federal participation, contrary
to this established policy.
Fourth, we cannot escape the conclusion that injection of
medical care as a separately matched category of expendi-
ture under public assistance is only a forerunner to the
injection of medical care as a categorical benefit under
old age and survivors insurance. You are aware of the
overwhelming rejection by both the American people and the
medical profession of this philosophy. As physicians, we
must continue to oppose programs which, in the guise of
improving medical care, will lead to the destruction of
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the system which has produced the best medical care ever
enjoyed by any people.
In summary, the American Medical Association is
vigorously opposed to the proposed changes in the medical
care provisions of the public assistance sections of the
Social Security Act. We are opposed to those changes
because they are needless, wasteful, dangerous, and
contrary to the established policy of gradual Federal
withdrawal from local public assistance programs. (U.S.
Congress, 1956)
Of note, is that at this time in our history, the
compelling ideological and political pressures to quickly
provide this safety net of healthcare for the nation's aged,
disabled and needy, overrode the need to consider, in-depth,
the economics of alternative means by which the healthcare
would be financed.
Former Congressman, Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee from 1958 to 1974, aptly
described the social and political pressures for federal
intervention in the healthcare delivery system in a
monograph [Ref. 16:p. 3], 1985:
In 1950, we began, on a modest basis, to authorize the
idea of "vendor payments" for medical care to needy public
assistance recipients, an idea that Wilbur J. Cohen
brought to our attention as a means of getting some
experience in the medical services area. We expanded and
modified this idea in 1954 and 1956 at the same time we
were strengthening the social security program. In 1957,
1959, and 1960, we held hearings and discussions on the
Forand Medicare bill. In 1960, we also held extensive
hearings on a nationwide medical assistance proposal
advocated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Arthur S.
Flemming, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Out of these deliberations came a revised proposal for
Federal grants to the States to improve medical assistance
to the needy aged. In the Senate, the House version was
revised with the aid of Senator Robert S. Kerr of Oklahoma
and Wilbur J. Cohen, and it became the Kerr-Mills legisla-
tion of 1960, which I sponsored as a stopgap measure for
21
the needy until we could obtain agreement on any further
legislation.
The Kerr-Mills legislation became a controversial measure
in the early 1960 's because it only dealt with the needy
aged, and I could see that something more would have to be
adopted eventually. President John F. Kennedy and Vice
President Lyndon B. Johnson were pressing strongly for a
Medicare-type insurance program for all the aged. But I
also could see that such a Legislative measure did not
have the necessary votes at that time in the Committee on
Ways and Means or in the House of Representatives. For 4
years (1951-1964), we struggled to find compromises,
adjustments, and adaptations that might lead to agreement
between the House and Senate. These discussions broke
down in the conference on the 1964 social security
legislation. I outlined some of the problems we had to
resolve in an address I gave on September 28, 1964, which
I placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of October 3, 1964.
With the resounding victory of President Lyndon B. Johnson
in the 1964 campaign, it was inevitable that some Medicare
program would be adopted in 1965. I proceeded promptly to
try to develop a legislative package that could be passed.
It became increasingly clear to me, however, as I studied
the programs and consulted with many interested groups,
that a Medicare hospital insurance program for the aged
alone was not sufficient to meet the many medical problems
of the aged, blind, and disabled or the mothers and
children receiving aid for dependent children. With
Wilbur Cohen's help, we developed what eventually became
Medicaid (Title XIX) and Medicare. Then, with the support
of John W. Byrnes, the ranking minority member on the
Committee, we added voluntary coverage of Physicians'
services in what became Part B or supplementary medical
insurance (SMI). That three-part program, enacted in
1965, has been an important and essential part of our
national safety net for the past 20 years, along with
social security and the Supplemental Security Income
program enacted in 1972.
In the same 1965 legislation, we improved the social
security program (old age survivors and disability in-
surance) as well as the public assistance programs. In
this year of the 30th anniversary of the original Social
Security Act of 1935, and the 20th anniversary of Medicare
and Medicaid, I am proud of the part I played in helping




2- Cost Concerns Relating to Medicare and Medicaid
In essence. Congress created additional demand for
healthcare and provided an open checkbook to capitalize the
industry's expansion. With no limits on what was considered
appropriate healthcare, the healthcare industry created
additional demand for services simply by providing them.
The government paid for health services without considera-
tion of what level of service was appropriate, or if those
services, appropriate or not, were being provided in a cost
effective manner. Utilization and peer reviews were not
included in the enacted legislation. Hospitals increased
their margins by increasing revenues, by providing more
services, not minimizing services provided or the associated
costs.
Medicare was designed as a federal program,
providing to all citizens, uniform eligibility and benefits
as part of the Federal Social insurance program.
Medicaid was an outgrowth of earlier social programs
to improve access to healthcare to the disadvantaged.
Medicaid eligibility is based upon need, tied to eligibility
for welfare benefits established by the Social Security Act.
It is administered by the States and supported by federal
grants.
With the rocketing costs of healthcare, following
the Federal government's entry into the healthcare system.
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the government struggled to find ways to control ever
increasing expenditures.
As described earlier, rising expenditures were a
function of an increasing population, increasing cost of
inputs and an increase in the intensity of services provided
to consumers. Unable to control the population, in fact
establishing unfettered access to healthcare as the social
norm, the Federal sector first turned to develop policies
promoting cost effectiveness. New reimbursement methods,
limiting capital growth, were finally initiated. Efforts to
create incentives to cut costs by sharing documented
savings with providers were made. Legislation to withhold
payment for perceived unreasonable per diem costs was
enacted in the 1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act.
1971 brought the Economic Stabilization Program that
introduced mandatory price controls to the healthcare
industry, lasting through 1974. The Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, reacting to continuing escala-
tion of healthcare costs, set prospective limits on
Medicare reimbursement and allowable increases in reimbur-
sable costs per discharge. Responding to the State's
dilemma in meeting the costs of their Medicaid programs.
Section 2175 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981 gave the States flexibility in moving from a reimburse-
ment system based upon cost to other methods of determining
reimbursement. [Ref. 15:pp. 16,17]
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Efforts were eventually made to address the issue of
appropriateness of care. The 1972 Amendment to the Social
Security Act included the establishment of Professional
Standards Review Organizations (PSRO) . The primary thrust
of PSROs was to eliminate unnecessary hospital days and
their related costs. All organizations caring for federally
funded patients were made subject to their scrutiny.
A series of regional Health Systems Agencies (HSA)
were put in place to review health planning efforts and
review certif icates-of-need for capital expenditures. HSAs
were to preclude over-capitalization and duplication of
effort within their jurisdictions.
As an expenditure reduction effort and as a means of
increasing the recipient's awareness of healthcare costs,
with the intention of reducing healthcare system utiliza-
tion, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
permitted the establishment of nominal co-payments in the
Medicaid system. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1982, in Section 2175, even went so far as to allow States
to reduce Medicaid costs by limiting beneficiary choice in
selecting healthcare providers. The Federal government, in
the Social Security Amendments of 1972, had also promoted
the growth of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) as a
means of decreasing hospital utilization through the
inherent organizational incentives to minimize the cost of
healthcare, thus increasing the organization's earnings.
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3. Cost Control Strategies
Out of all of the efforts to control the costs of
healthcare in general and federal outlays specifically, new
strategies, new incentives for limiting cost growth have
emerged. The most recent evolution has come about as the
result of one state's efforts, under flexibility provided by
the existing legislation.
In an effort to define elements of cost collection
for inpatient care that were clinically relevant and useful
as measures of product output, the State of New Jersey was
involved in the development and use of Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRG) for the purpose for prospective payment. New
Jersey started using DRGs for prospective payment to
hospitals on a limited basis in 1978. [Ref. 5:p. 234] The
approach of using DRGs, as a basis for prospective payment,
was evaluated by the Health Care Financing Administration.
The HCFA monitored the New Jersey implementation closely.
The decision to use prospective payment for the
Medicare system, starting in 1983, was based upon the
incentives built into the system to minimize costs for
treating a particular diagnosis.
Integral to the successful use of a DRG based
reimbursement system is a peer review mechanism. The peer
review organization is the means by which over-utilization
is identified and precluded, while healthcare delivery is
reviewed for acceptable quality of medical care rendered.
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These evaluations are based upon predetermined criteria,
applied to the review of medical record by Regional
contract-based Peer Review Organizations. (PRO) These PROs,
replaced the PSROs.
Other efforts to control costs, in and out of the
Federal sector are of note. In the private sector, hospital
chains have shown as increase in number and now control
about 13 percent of non-Federal, acute care beds in the
United States. [Ref. 15:p. 18]
This horizontal expansion of the hospital industry
has been accompanied by a vertical integration within the
healthcare industry. As is the case with other undifferen-
tiated products in a competitive environment, this integra-
tion of hospital supply, acute care, long-term care and
pre-paid health programs, serves to assure the involved
activities of their share of the healthcare market and
maintain control of input costs.
Capitation agreements, placing the risk of providing
total health services for individuals for a single fee, with
the provider, have grown in the current competitive environ-
ment. This is evident in the growth of HMOs in recent
years. HMOs have become, like preferred provider programs
and benefits packages offering different levels of coverage
and deductibles, choices open to consumers. The consumer
has become a player in determining how and where healthcare
will be delivered.
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4. Movement of POD Healthcare into a Competitive
Environment
It is into this competitive environment, focused on
cost containment, that DOD hospitals are being thrust.
Historically, healthcare provided within DOD facilities has
been based, on providing the most care possible with the
resources available. These resources, military owned
facilities, military manpower, civil service manpower,
capital equipment and operating funds are provided out of
four separate Congressional appropriations. These ap-
propriations are further broken down as they are divided
between the services.
The mechanisms required to integrate military and
civilian personnel, facilities construction and capital
investment and garner maximum utility from the DOD health-
care system are lacking. Without a strong proponency in any
of the appropriations funding DOD healthcare, the system,
understandably, has difficulty in maintaining an efficient
mode of operation. To give some idea of how healthcare
fares as a portion of the total DOD budget, as reported by
the Grace Commission in 1983 [Ref. 17:p. 1], the DOD health-
care budget for direct healthcare was $4.5 billion, less
than 2 percent of the total DOD request. In terms of
ability to handle cuts in its budget, the DOD healthcare
budget is hit severely when across the board reductions in
funding or manning levels occur.
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The problems with lack of proponency, the appropria-
tion structure inhibiting integration of requirements and
the lack of coordination between the Army, Navy and Air
Force medical communities are brought to the forefront with
the enactment of Public Law 99-661.
P.L. 99-661 requires that DOD use a DRG, case-mix,
based system for resource allocation for DOD inpatient
treatment at medical treatment facilities (MTF) after 30
September 1987 and for outpatient visits after 30 September
1988. A tri-service Task Force has been formed to address
the issues of developing such a system and implementing it
in DOD. A report to Congress on DOD ' s plans concerning the
development of a DRG based prospective payment system and
the concerns that must be addressed to make such a system
effective is included as an Appendix to this thesis.
C. SUMMARY
The involvement of the Federal government in the United
States healthcare system has grown to a point where it is
now concerned with effectiveness of care (PRO), quality
assurance, appropriateness of care (utilization review), and
efficiency or cost of care (DRG based prospective payment)
.
These concerns and the methodologies for managing them have
been addressed, first to the local, not for profit and
private sectors of the healthcare industry, and now to the
Federal (Veterans Administration and DOD) sector. DOD must
now adapt/develop information systems to support the
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implementation of PRO quality assurance, risk management,




The development of DRGs is a result of the need to
assess the performance of hospitals against some measure of
output. The measure of a final product in a hospital
setting is compounded with the numerous, intermediate
products (ancillary services) provided, and the varying
nature of care indicated for different medical problems.
The measure of output should represent the total cost of
services rendered to a patient.
In developing a series of case types, each type repre-
senting cases consuming similar services from a hospital,
Fetter and his associates considered the following at-
tributes essential to any system for grouping hospital
outputs. [Ref. l:p. 5]
"It must be interpretable medically with subclasses of
patients for homogeneous diagnostic categories. That is
when the patient classes are described to physicians,
they should be able to relate to these patients and be
able to identify a particular patient management process
for them.
Individual classes should be defined on variables that
are commonly available on hospital abstracts and are
relevant to output utilization, pertaining to either, the
condition of the patient or the treatment process.
There must be a manageable number of classes, prefer-
ably in the hundreds instead of thousands, that are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive. That is, they must
cover the entire range of possible disease conditions in
the acute-care setting, without overlap.
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The classes should contain patients with similar
expected measure of output utilization.
Class definitions must be comparable across the
different coding schemes."
Using the information from approximately 700,000
hospital records, diagnostic, demographic and treatment
characteristics were used in conjunction with the Inter-
national Classification of Disease, 8th revision (ICDA-8)
and HICDA-2 diagnostic codes to develop the DRGs. Table 2
outlines the strategy this Yale group took in breaking out
DRGs from the original data base. The 83 Major Diagnostic
Categories (MDC) , into which each record was first assigned,
were mutually exclusive and exhaustive groupings of ICDA-8
diagnosis that were medically related and relevant, as
assessed by physician review.
Revisions to the original 383 DRGs include a minor
revision adapted and used by the State of New Jersey and a
second larger, 470 DRG classification, based upon ICD-9-CM
codes and used by Medicare.
Research efforts at the Naval School of Health Sciences
[Ref. 9] have validated the use of DRGs as a measure of
performance for Navy hospitals. Performance, based on
length-or-stay or cost for example, can be compared between
hospitals. DRGs can be used as the basis for utilization
review and quality assurance/risk assessment efforts. The




YALE ICDA-8 DRG FORMATION PROCESS
STEP 1. ASSIGN ALL PATIENT RECORDS TO ONE OF 83 MAJOR
DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORIES USING PRIMARY DISCHARGE
DIAGNOSIS.
STEP 2. SCREEN OUT POTENTIALLY ABERRANT RECORDS:
DEATHS
RECORDS WITH INCOMPLETE DATA
EXCEPTIONALLY LONG LENGTH OF STAYS
STEP 3. SELECT SUBGROUPS OF PATIENTS USING CLINICAL
ATTRIBUTES AS VARIABLES THAT EXPLAIN VARIATION





STEP 4. REPEAT STEP 3 UNTIL TERMINAL SUBGROUPS (DRGS)
ARE FORMED ACCORDING TO STOPPING RULES:
SIZE OF GROUP LESS THAT 100 OR
ADDITIONAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED LESS THAN 1
PERCENT OR
NOT MEDICALLY MEANINGFUL TO DIVIDE FURTHER
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B. DRG RATE DEVELOPMENT
Central to using DRGs for prospective payment is the
method of rate setting and underlying assumptions of cost
behavior. The methodology used by New Jersey in establish-
ing its DRG rate structure will be discussed next.
Four groups for classifying cost centers were defined.
"Ancillary cost centers: includes costs associated with
radiology, laboratory, etc; defined to be 100% variable
with volume; allocated to patients through charges.
Routine cost centers: includes costs associated with
laundry and linen, dietary housekeeping, etc.; defined to
vary less than 100% with volume; allocated to patients by
first being allocated to direct patient care (ancillary/-
routine) or indirect cost centers on the basis of
statistics furnished for each general services cost
center.
Indirect cost centers: includes costs associated with the
physical installation such as utilities and administra-
tion; defined to be 100% fixed in the short run; not
allocated to patients as part of direct patient care cost
by apportioned to each DRG as a uniform percentage makeup
on the direct patient care cost of the DRG."
[Ref. 15:p. 237]
The costs are allocated only to inpatients. The costs
for outpatient care are removed from the cost pools. The
cost centers are then aggregated into the four groups
previously described.
Under this total cost concept, general services costs
are first stepped down to routine, ancillary and indirect
cost centers. These are the user categories that will now
be allocated on the activity bases previously define.
Next, the total activity base (charges, patient day;
direct patient care cost) is summed for all patients with
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valid abstracts. Patients that have died or experienced a
length of stay significantly longer than average for that
applicable DRG (outliers) are excluded from computations.
The costs and activity base related to these aberrant cases
are not used in determining DRG rates.
After establishing the cost allocation base, the direct
patient care costs, ancillary costs and routine costs are
allocated to patients by using the ratio of costs/unit of
allocation for each direct care cost center multiplied by
the units of the allocation base used by each patient.
At this point approximately 60% of the total costs have
been allocated. In the New Jersey experience, indirect
costs comprise about 40% of total cost. This 40% includes
bad debts, capital costs and administrative costs.
[Ref. 15:p. 238]
With the calculation of hospital specific direct costs
per patient, construction of the DRG reimbursement rate
begins. To establish an equitable standard cost per case
the state of New Jersey performs an equalization of labor
costs. The equalization factor for each hospital is the
nonphysician direct patient care costs (prior to allocation
of general services costs) at state wide average pay scales
by class of labor, divided by nonphysician direct care costs
at labor market average pay scales by class of labor. In
New Jersey there are 11 geographic labor market areas and
eight labor categories. This factor is then applied to
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direct patient care costs for each hospital, the costs for
all hospitals aggregated by DRG and then divided by the
number of patients in that DRG. The result is an average
statewide direct patient care cost per DRG. It should be
noted that this process is done separately for teaching and
nonteaching hospitals.
An individual hospital's DRG rate for direct patient
care is then derived by taking the hospital's average actual
direct patient care costs per DRG case and blending it with
the average statewide average cost per DRG case. The blend
is based upon the dispersion costs in forming the DRG rate.
The coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean)
determines what portion of the payment rate is based upon
the hospital's actual costs per DRG. The result being that
the more widely dispersed a hospital's cost per DRG, the
more of their costs are included in the DRG payment rate.
The indirect costs are handled in two ways. The
administrative and general services costs, not previously
allocated to direct patient care cost centers are screened
by the State on a cost per unit of activity for each cost
center against the median unit cost per unit of activity.
This creates incentives for low cost providers and pressure
for high cost providers to become more efficient. The
indirect elements of cost related to facilities capitaliza-
tion, bad debt and in some case an allowance for working
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cash infusion are not screened, but are add-ons to the final
payment rate for each hospital.
The Medicare reimbursement system varies somewhat from
that used in New Jersey. Payment for Medicare is based on
five factors:
-An adjusted Federal standard rate
-Adjustment of hospital costs based on regional wage
indexes
-DRG to which a discharge is assigned
-DRG adjustment to per diem hospital cost
-A hospital specific adjustment that ensures budget
neutrality during the implementation phase of prospec-
tive payment
The adjusted Federal rate is based upon a report of
national hospital costs for 1981. Applicable, allowable
costs from this report are adjusted for case-mix, indirect
medical education costs, the national and regional wage
indexes and cost of living. After disregarding outliers
and adjusting for overall budget neutrality, a standard rate
per case is produced.
The hospital specific rate is determined based upon 1982
cost and discharge information for specific hospitals.
After adjusting for inflation to current year dollars, a
hospital specific amount per Medicare is determined. This
rate is used to ensure budget neutrality at the hospital
level while implementing prospective payment.
As the transition to prospective payment is completed,
the Federal rate will wholly determine reimbursement. The
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regional adjustment to the Federal rate and the hospital
specific adjustment will no longer be used in calculating
reimbursement. At that point in time hospitals will be
subject to the incentives built into the prospective
reimbursement strategy.
C. SEVERITY OF ILLNESS INDEXES
There are some problems identifiable with the ability of
DRGs to accurately project actual cost. Among the concerns
is the type of hospital (teaching, nonteaching) , stage of
disease process at admission, severity of illness and
intensity of nursing care provided. Several proposed
refinements to the development of DRG rates will be
discussed.
Disease staging, developed at Jefferson Medical College
by Joseph Gonnella [Ref. 18 :p. 2] is a computerized system
that places each diagnosis into one of over 400 conditions
and subsequently assigns the case to one of 4 disease stages
(5 for neoplasms). This assignment, based upon the specific
diagnosis, is predicated upon clinical observations of
specialists. Since disease runs its own course through its
various phases and the resources consumed for a given stage
of a disease are not the same as that of a different
disease, over 1,700 potential classification groups of
resource consumption exist. [Ref. 18:p. 2]
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Severity of Illness Indexing, developed under Susan
Horn, John Hopkins University is based upon the evaluation
of a patient's chart at discharge on seven dimensions by
trained raters. The characteristics of the patient's stay
that are rated are:
-Stage of principal diagnosis.
-Complication of the principal condition.
-Concurrent interacting conditions that affect the
hospital course.
-Dependency on hospital staff.
-Extent of non-operating room life support procedures.
-Rate of response to therapy or rate of recovery.
-Impairment remaining after therapy for the acute aspect
of the hospitalization. [Ref. 3:p. 33]
These seven considerations of a patient's hospitali-
zation are scored on basis of 4 levels of increasing
severity. The criteria used for the severity rating are
defined for the raters and the raters receive intensive
training in discriminating between severity categories.
Table 3 shows the relationships between the seven charac-
teristics and 4 levels of severity.
As reported by Horn, et al., more than 95 percent of the
individual raters achieved greater than 90 percent agreement
on blind re-rating of a sample of charts. This was after
two months of experience with severity of illness criteria.
The ability to consistently rate severity of illness using
this methodology was demonstrated. [Ref. 3:p. 33] An
adjustment to the portion of the DRG cost attributed to
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routine care, now allocated only on the basis of patient
days, could be useful in matching DRG rates to actual cost
of care provided.
A direct adjustment to routine care costs, based solely
upon a measure of nursing intensity has also been proposed.
The difference in intensity of nursing required for
different DRGs is easily understood. Take for example DRG
368, of the New Jersey system which includes third degree
burns and the need for constant nursing attention and
compare it to DRG 181, minor problems of the teeth, and the
relatively low intensity of nursing involvement. Yet under
the current unadjusted allocation base of patient days, each
DRG would be allocated nursing costs on the same rate per
day. Thompson advocates a nursing intensity adjustment at
the DRG level, not the Major Diagnostic Category. To this
end four strategies have been proposed. [Ref. 19:p. 49]
-Special studies examining the specific amounts of nursing
care patients receive.
-Adapting current nurse staffing algorithms to estimates
of nurse resources used during a hospital stay.
-Direct assignment of nursing activities to patients on a
regular basis.
-Using nursing diagnosis to attempt to estimate care
given to patients.
D. AVG DEVELOPMENT
Public Law 99-661 mandated the use of DRGs not only for
resource allocation for inpatient care, but also outpatient
care. There is not a nationally accepted model for
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outpatient reimbursement for ambulatory visit groups (AVG)
.
One of the primary problems facing DOD in the development of
AVGs is a lack of biometrics data. Information is currently
collected only for number of visits to outpatient clinics.
Information related to diagnosis, symptoms, ancillary
services used, treatment and follow on treatment and human
resources consumed is not captured.
Several approaches to developing AVG were reviewed.
Three will be discussed. Reason for Visit, Patient-Based,
Time-Oriented Indexes and Diagnostic Groupings.
1 . Reason for Visit Classification
The National Center for Health Statistics, Depart-
ment of Health Education and Welfare started the National
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey in May 1973. Now a con-
tinuous study, this vehicle is to provide national statis-
tics on out-patient visits. Participating physicians
complete Patient Record forms for samples of patients seen.
One of the data elements of this form is the patients
perceived need in seeking care, the reason for visit.
Figure 2 provides a sample of the Patient Record form
showing the data elements surveyed. [Ref. 20:p. 3] Using
200 codes, grouped into 13 classes, this system was
developed to code the patient's reason for visit (RFV)
.
The RFV classification system is constructed of 7
modules. The modules represent the basic reasons for a
patient to visit an out-patient facility. They are:
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-Administrative [Ref. 14:p. 4]
The RFV classification system consists of two parts,
the tabular list of categories (Table 4), and an index of
specific terms for classifying lay terminology. The tabular
list, broken down into the seven modules listed above, is
oriented in a body system approach.
-A patient presenting with a complaint is classified by
the stated concern. The outcome of this type of visit is
diagnostic tests, examination or and probable diagnosis.
-If a patient should present with a diagnosis, own or
another physicians, it is expected confirming tests would
ensue.
-A patient presenting for tests or screening can be
expected to receive the procedure indicated.
-Treatment visits are expected to result in some thera-
peutic process.
-A patient returning to receive test results is recorded
as such
-Emergency visits, trauma, adverse responses to treatment
will result in immediate care in answer to the reason for
visit.
-Insurance physicals, court-ordered exams and certificates
of health are examples of care coded in the administra-
tive module.
The alphabetic index of terms and associated codes
are to facilitate accurate translation of lay terminology
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into a RFV classification. The system is designed for a
second level of detail in coding RFV. Depending on the
needs of the data user and presentation by the patient the
second level may or may not be used.
2 . Patient-Based, Time-Oriented Indexes
The Patient-Based, Time-Orient Indexes were
developed from a study of hospital-based primary group
practice at the San Francisco Veterans Administration
Medical Center. [Ref. 7:p. 781] The object of this study
was to classify isoresource consumption groups, organized in
a clinically meaningful manner for ambulatory care. The
resource consumption is based on one year's course of
treatment, not an individual visit. Three approaches were
taken to grouping resource use.
The first approach was a problem-oriented index.
Based on the problems presented by a patient over the course
of a year, the charges related to each problem are evaluated
in terms of how much of the total charges of caring for that
patient are related to a specific problem. The number of
problems that it takes to account for 50% of a years care
determines the patient's "P" rating. If the primary problem
accounts for 50% or more of charges for a year, the patient
is classified P-1, if it takes the top two primary problems
to account for 50% of a year's charges, the patient is
classified P-2 and so-on.
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The second approach was diagnosis-based. It related
resources to diagnosis groups. Charges for patients were
first calculated. Then based upon charges the cases were
grouped into 17 Major Diagnostic Groups. This approach was
also modified to provide for assignment of a patient to a
resource group for a primary and then a secondary diagnosis.
A secondary diagnosis was included where the primary
diagnosis did not account for 50% of the charges incurred
for a patient year.
3 . Ambulatory Patient Related Groups
Under contract to the Health Care Financing
Administration, Fetter has also defined a set of Ambulatory
Patient Related Groups (APG) based upon diagnosis, using the
same software and criteria used in developing DRGs. These
groupings of ambulatory visits possess similar clinical
attributes and utilization patterns. [Ref. 16:p. 3]
The assumption that patterns of resource use are
related to diagnosis through diagnostic tests required and
subsequent course of treatment is central to this grouping
approach.
ICDA-8 codes were divided into 14 Major Ambulatory
Categories (MAC) that are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
(Table 5) A MAC is determined on the basis of organ system
affected. Once assigned to a MAC the cases studied were
evaluated on the basis of:
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TABLE 5
LIST OF MAJOR AMBULATORY CATEGORIES
Initial
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The source of information relating to these
variables was the NAMCS Patient Form. These variables were
examined to determine what variable best explained the
variance in resource use. All divisions were evaluated by
physicians for clinical relevance. Three governing guide-
lines were used in creating APGs. [Ref. 16:p. 6]
-When partitioning new patients the use of the variable
presenting problem was favored over the use of diagnosis
because a primary diagnosis is usually established until
the end of a visit.
-Non-clinical variables such as type of visit or referral
were used whenever possible before using clinical
variables such as diagnosis or presenting problem.
-Within a MAC attempts were made to be consistent in the
way groups were formed. For example, if age is used as a
partitioning variable in more than one place in the
definition of the APGs for a particular MAC then the same
age categories should be used.
154 APGs resulted from this process. These APGs
were determined to be clinically meaningful and represent
similar resource use with APGs.
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V. ANALYSIS/ INTERPRETATION
A. MOVEMENT OF HEALTHCARE INTO A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
Understanding the Federal government's interest in
controlling the rising costs of healthcare and the incen-
tives of competitive strategies, such as prospective
reimbursement by DRG and copayments, the down-side of the
competitive environment must be considered. The competi-
tive environment has meant, larger co-payments for benefici-
aries, less choice in selecting providers, fewer patient
days for hospital stays, and a consideration of efficiency
of care delivery with a diminished emphasis on the complete-
ness or maximum effort delivered in caring for an individual
patient.
Increasing co-payments can mean that access to health
care is no longer equitable across social classes. Par-
ticularly for low income families, such as the lower
enlisted rates in the military, co-payments bar free access
to the healthcare system. This runs contrary to the
original intent of Congress in its intervention into the
healthcare system. Equitable access to all classes was a
driving force in early legislation. This is an issue of
which we must not lose sight.
Any changes made to the military healthcare system
should insure that access is assured to all beneficiaries
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and access is equitable across all user groups and quality
of care is of prime concern in assessing these changes.
As a result of prospective payment and other incentive
strategies, total patient days have declined from 280
million in 1981 to 240 million in 1985, nearly a 1.5
percent decrease. [Ref. 21:p. 35] While, in terms of cost,
this is a positive movement, what does it mean in terms of
quality-of-care? Patients are being moved out of hospitals
sooner. Burdens on family and agencies providing home care
are increased. Peer review may find quantifying a criterion
for "well enough" to go home a difficult task. With
efficiency, rather than total service, now of primary
concern, the patient loses. For those who can afford to
pay, the service and attention will be there, for those
dependent on payment under a competitively structured rate
"well enough" will have to do.
Under a competitive environment, the character of
research is apt to change. Rather than forge head into new
technologies that produce increased benefits to the patient
and improve the quality of care, innovation is more likely
to focus on the efficiency of current processes. Medicine
as a science will advance less quickly, but become
efficient.
B. BASIS FOR NAVY DRG RATE STRUCTURE UNDER CURRENT CON-
STRAINTS OF APPROPRIATIONS AND COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
Using the cost center groupings employed in the New
Jersey DRG rate structure model, an attempt has been made
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to translate the cost center groupings and behavior of costs
into an approach that incorporates the limitations of the
appropriation structure that the Navy Medical Department
faces
.
Of note is the fact that while Operations and Main-
tenance, Navy (OM,N) and Military Pay, Navy (MP,N) personnel
are indicated as 100 percent variable in several of the cost
center groupings, they in actuality are not easily changed.
The movement/ loss of civilian positions/military billets is
a laborious administrative process.
These elements of costs represent what the author
considers to be minimum levels of consideration in determin-
ing an appropriate DRG rate structure.
C. CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR NAVY DRG RATE CONSTRUCTION GIVEN
CURRENT CONSTRAINTS OF COST ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIA-
TION STRUCTURE
In order to collect costs that can be used for es-
tablishing DRG rates for the Navy Medical Department and for
monitoring of hospital performance by hospital management,
the author proposes the collection and allocation of costs
of hospital care using the following categories of cost
collection pools and indicated bases for allocation:
Direct inpatient care cost center groupings
Ancillary costs (inpatient only) -100% variable
OM,N personnel
MP,N personnel
OM,N consumables and other
OM,N expense equipment <$25K
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Prior to patient level accounting, allocate by weighted
unit of activity to MDC or DRG . After patient level
accounting, charge directly.
Patient care costs (inpatient only) -100% variable
OM,N personnel
MP,N personnel
OM,N consumables and other
OM,N expense equipment <$25K
Prior to SOI adjustment, allocate by patient day. After
SOI adjustment allocate by adjusted patient day.




OM,N consumables and other
OM,N expense equipment
Allocate to cost centers by activity base of each
general services cost center.




OM,N consumables and other
OM,N expense equipment <$25K
Transfer costs to administrative support costs
Administrative support cost centers-100% fixed
OM,N personnel
MP,N personnel
OM,N consumables and other
OM,N expense equipment <$25K
Allocate to direct patient care (inpatient and out-
patient) cost centers based on application rate of
administrative support costs/total direct patient care
cost center.
Capital equipment costs-OP,N>$25K
Without a methodology to amortize, keep out of DRG rate.
If amortized, allocate to benefitting cost center.
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Capital facilities costs-OM,N minor construction and
Military Construction.
Without a methodology to amortize, keep out of DRG rate
structure. If amortized, allocate to benefitting cost
center.
D. INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR COST CENTERS AND BASIS FOR
ALLOCATION
For proper cost accounting for hospital costs and
subsequent allocation of costs to benefitting cost centers,
the following information must be collected as part of the





wage rate for position
hours worked by position
weighted tests by DRG
Establish total OM,N personnel costs for cost element,




composite rate for person in billet
hours worked by person in billet
weighted tests by DRG
Establish total OM,N personnel costs for cost element
allocate, over base of weighted tests, to DRG by
weighted tests per DRG
OM,N consumables, expense equipment and misc.
cost for period
weighted test by DRG
Allocate cost for cost element, over base of weighted
tests, to DRG, by weighted tests per DRG
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Patient care cost centers
OM,N personnel
filled positions
wage rate for position
hours worked by position
patient days by DRG
Allocate total OM,N personnel costs for cost element, by
base of patient days, to DRG by patient days per DRG
MP,N personnel
filled billets
composite rate for person in billet
hours worked by person in billet
patient days by DRG
Allocate total OM,N personnel costs for cost element, by
base of patient days, to DRG by patient days per DRG
OM,N consumables, expense equipment and misc.
cost for period
patient days by DRG
Allocate cost for cost element, over base of patient
days, to DRG by patient days per DRG
General services cost centers
OM,N personnel
filled positions
wage rate for position
hours worked by position
units of activity (UA) for cost centers served
Allocate total OM,N personnel costs for cost element, by




composite rate for person in billet
hours worked by person in billet
UA for cost centers served
Allocate total MP,N personnel costs for cost element, by
base of total UA, to serviced cost centers by UA per
cost center
OM,N consumables, expense equipment and misc.
cost for period
UA for cost centers serviced
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Allocate cost for cost element, over base of total UA,
to serviced cost centers by UA per cost center Ad-
ministrative support cost centers
OM,N personnel
filled positions
wage rate for position
hours worked by position
total direct patient care cost by DRG after
all other allocations
Allocate total OM,N personnel costs for cost element to
DRG on a basis of percentage of cost of direct patient




composite rate for person in billet
hours worked by person in billet
total direct patient care cost DRG after all
other allocations
Allocate total MP,N personnel costs for cost element to
DRG on a basis of percentage of cost of direct patient
care applied to DRGs divided by total direct patient
care costs
The need for such detail in the OM,N and MP,N personnel
cost elements is that, MP,N costs are not directly funded.
MP,N costs are born by Naval Military Personnel Command,
however the utilization of these people must be considered
in the operation of a hospital. No hospital will have the
same mix of military, civil service and contractor services.
By being able to calculate the MP,N/OM,N cost ratios by
command by DRG, the differences in staffing and levels of
direct (OM,N) funding can be realized.
It is apparent, given the current multi-appropriation
structure and lack of patient level accounting systems, that
the construction of a reasonably accurate, useful, DRG rate
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structure is not a reasonable expectation. Once con-
structed, the ability to make trade-offs in personnel
(military and civilian), capital equipment and facilities,
in order to achieve efficiencies, in providing care for DRG
specific courses of treatment, is severely limited by the
appropriation structure. Incentives to cut costs are not
realizable at the activity level. Additionally, one
concern of the Grace Commission's committee or the manage-
ment of federally funded hospitals was the omission of
facilities related capital costs from the cost accounting
system. [Ref. 17 :p. 68] Without some method to amortize
construction and other capital investment costs in DOD
accounting, this concern remains unaddressed.
E. CURRENT DOD COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
The Uniform Chart Of Accounts is DODs current method of
cost collection. This system collects workload and expense







The Ancillary and Support costs are subsequently stepped
down to the other four categories.
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This UCA system can serve as the framework around which
a comprehensive, patient level cost accounting structure can
be built. Problems with the system, as it currently exists
revolve around reporting total cost. The Grace Commission
[Ref. 17:p. 68] Private Sector Survey on Cost Control,
Report on Federal Hospitals found what it considered two
areas of concern with UCA information. The first concern is
that UCA allows the allocation of costs to the Special
Programs category that are in reality part of routine care
operations. The second concern is the exclusion of overhead
expenses relating to headquarters, malpractice, insurance,
military benefits and training commands from inclusion in
UCA cost data.
Other concerns relating to the usefulness of UCA data,
as now compiled, are usefulness to management at the
activity level and timeliness. UCA data is compiled at the
activity level quarterly, summarized and forwarded to
headquarters and then screened before being provided back to
activities in a usable format. Because of the aggregation
of statistical military pay information and capital expense
information, not controlled by the activity, with the
expense information from operating funds, controlled by the
activity, it is extremely difficult for activity heads to
determine where accountability for costs lie. Since UCA was
designed primarily as a tool for DOD to report to Congress,
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the information and the way it is reported are not par-
ticularly useful to individual commands.
Local commanders base their decisions primarily on OM,N
funding considerations. The manner in which manpower and
capital expenditures are now centrally controlled, makes the
only discretionary portion of costs controllable at the
hospital level, operating funds. There is no standard
configuration for hospital OM,N cost reporting.
Local management philosophy and the differing capabil-
ities of accounting systems from one location to another,
dictates how cost centers are organized.
Congress introduced payment by DRG to create incentives
for controlling costs. Controlling costs under DRG
prospective payment assumes the ability of hospital
management to identify these costs by DRG and patient and
then the ability to change either the costs for care in a
DRG or alter the case mix. These case mix changes would
have hospitals concentrate on patients in DRGs that they can
treat cost effectively.
F. SUMMARY
The lack of a patient level cost accounting system to
permit proper management analysis has already been es-
tablished. The inability of hospital commanders in DOD to
make many of the tradeoff decisions in order to control
costs has also been cited. With management of military
personnel and civilian man years and control of capital
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expenditures for facilities and equipment centralized at the
Service level, hospital commanders and left with few ways in
which to approach the issue of efficiency in providing
healthcare. Given this environment, it is incumbent on
higher levels of decision making to analyze the distribution
of resources.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. IMPLICATIONS
Public Law 99-661 mandates the use of DRGs as a resource
allocation tool in DOD. This must happen. It is law. In
order for DRGs to be used in this manner, the workload and
cost allocation systems of DOD must be much more highly
refined than at present.
The intent of DRGs is to promote efficiencies in
providing healthcare. As identified by the Grace Commission
[Ref. 17:p. 65], the lack of central coordination of DOD
healthcare policy has fostered the operation of three,
autonomous, service unique healthcare delivery systems. The
staffing, accounting and operational aspects of these three
systems differ. This has resulted in duplication of effort
within geographic areas and resulted in inefficiencies in
providing healthcare at the DOD level. It follows that, in
order to address these issues of disparities between the
services and lack of central policies, a strong central DOD
organizational element must exist to create and implement
healthcare policy.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Based upon research performed by the Research Depart-
ment, Naval School of Health Sciences [Ref. 9], DRGs
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represent a valid tool for Navy hospitals to use in resource
allocation and performance evaluation. Variables relating
to resources consumed, in this case length of stay, were
found to correlate significantly between cases used by the
Yale group in establishing DRGs and the a sample of Navy
cases. However, the informations systems to support case
mix management must be forthcoming in order for the benefits
of DRG management to be realized.
Sensing the lack of direction and commitment at the DOD
level to approach the issue of rising healthcare costs, in
a proactive fashion. Congress has legislated the use of a
prospective reimbursement methodology for the DOD health-
care system.
In order to implement this DRG based methodology for
resource allocation, DOD must address its problems in the
areas of:
-lack of standard accounting systems
-lack of patient level accounting systems
-lack of information system on which to base ambulatory
visit resource allocation system
-lack of flexibility in appropriation structure
-lack of flexibility in administrative policies governing
manpower issues
DOD has requested (Appendix) a phased implementation of




-integrate current cost accounting and workload
data
-develop DRG resource allocation model




-allocate and budget for impatient care based on
DRGs
FY 1990-1991
-refine case-mix management capability
-introduce patient-level cost accounting
FY 1992 and beyond
-address issues of appropriation process and
structures of Services that affect management
flexibility
Implementation of DRG based resource allocation also
brings with it the use of DRGs as a means of evaluating
utilization and quality assurance/ risk management. The
clinical communities within DOD need to be involved in the
development of evaluation criteria in order that they, the
link in the system that directly determines resource use at
the patient level, have an understanding and appreciation




!• POD should proceed as quickly as possible to develop
the needed cost and workload information systems to support
resource allocation by DRG .
The problems addressed in Appendix A, in regard to
the need for standardized cost accounting across the
services, are a major impediment to using DRGs for resource
allocation and performance evaluation. The integrated
hospital information system known as the Composite Health
Care System (CHCS) should include all of the elements
necessary to permit case mix management by DRG and allow
the development of an ambulatory visit group methodology
for resource allocation and performance evaluation.
2 . POD should establish a central health entity.
The Grace Commission has recommended that a central health
entity be established to address issues of :
-duplication of services
-duplication of facilities
-lack of standard accounting systems among Services
-lack of standard staffing standards among Services
-underutilization of Service's healthcare facilities
-lack of planning and policy element for DOD healthcare
The creation of a central health entity and its
subsequent policies regarding the issues above would
provide POP the means of getting beyond service rivalries
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and service unique traditions and addressing the issues of
efficiency and effectiveness of healthcare in DOD.
It is only through a strong, centrally controlled
effort that the problems raised in dealing with implementa-
tion of the provisions of P.L. 99-661 and other healthcare
policy issues can be effectively met. Anything less than a
central health entity precludes full, timely and consistent
treatment of healthcare issues by the Services.
The mandate of P.L. 99-661 to use DRGs for resource
allocation has served not only to introduce a management
tool, but implementation of this tool has forced DOD to look
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Public Law 99-661 stipulates that a Diagnosis Related Group
(DRG) based system be established as the primary basis for resource
allocation within DoD medical treatment facilities (MTFs) for
inpatient treatments after 30 September 1988.
Having devoted substantial staff resources toward satisfying
the congressional direction regarding DRGs, we have identified many
issues that must be resolved before a DRG based allocation
mechanism can be initiated systemwide. Problems with the quality
of the diagnoses and procedure coding and differences in the
availability of data among the Services present significant, indeed
insurmountable, obstacles to creating a comprehensive inpatient
resource allocation methodology by 1 October 1987. Consequently, a
phased implementation is proposed beginning with the development
and testing of an allocation simulation model in FY 1988 and actual
resource allocation by the Services beginning 1 October 1988. This
approach proceeds to accomplish legislative intent as soon as is
possible.
Additionally, we must conclude that the Military Health Service
System (MHSS) cannot establish DRGs for outpatient services during
FY 1989 because we lack both a data collection capability and a
valid ambulatory visit group (AVG) methodology. Currently, there
is no nationally accepted model for collecting ambulatory workload.
In the May 1988 report to congress, these problems will be
discussed more completely and a phased plan for implementation of
an AVG system presented.
The phased plan for implementing inpatient DRGs includes
activities for FY 1988-1992 and beyond. During FY 1988, the MHSS
will develop the following: 1) a program to integrate financial.
Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System (MEPRS), and
biostatistical data: 2) a resource allocation and simulation
model; and 3) MTF level information systems to support case-mix
management. During FY 1989, the Services will begin to allocate
and budget for inpatient resources based on DRGs. The activities
in FY 1990-1991 will involve improvements in the sophistication of
the case-mix management capability with the development of a
patient level cost accounting system and the implementation of the
Composite Health Care System (CHCS) . During FY 1992 and beyond,
efforts will center on evaluating the need for structural changes
in the budgeting and appropriations process and within the
individual Services to promote increased management flexibility.
There is no doubt that the implementation of a DRG resource
allocation system represents a significant change in how the
Services presently manage. Adapting a prospective reimbursement
model to a military system which has limited management flexibility
and receives resources through multiple appropriations presents a
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challenge. We are eager to satisfy congressional intent and
overcome the obstacles to implementing the system but, must point
out that a considerable investment in time, money, and manpower
will be required to develop the necessary MTF level case-mix
management capability. Additional funds, as yet unprogrammed, are
necessary for increased personnel, training programs, and enhance-
ments to current information systems. At this stage of our
efforts, we have not been able to quantify the resources required
over the next several years to implement a resource allocation and
management system. Until these unprogrammed resources are
identified, it is not entirely clear that the anticipated benefits
will justify the investment of resources.
Assuming that the Congress shares our concerns, it may wish to
reconsider and revise the time frame identified in the present




This report informs Congress of plans within the Department of
Defense (DoD) to allocate resources utilizing Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRGs) in compliance with Public Law 99-661; Title 10 USC,
Chapter 55, Section 1101, which stipulates that a DRG based
allocation system by established for inpatient treatments after 30
September 1987 and for outpatient treatments after 30 September
1988.
The perceived benefit of implementing DRGs within DoD is
supported by the national decline in both length of stay (LOS) and
admission rates following adoption of DRGs by Medicare for
inpatient hospital reimbursement. The cost savings that occur
depend on the capability of individual civilian hospitals to
respond to the efficiency incentives in the Prospective Payment
System (PPS). However, unlike the separate relationship that
exists between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and its reimbursed provider hospitals, DoD manages and
budgets for its medical treatment facilities (MTFs) . Although much
simpler to design and implement, it would be counterproductive to
impose a DRG-based allocation scheme on the Services unless a
parallel case-mix management system is also constructed. Until the
investment cost required to provide a patient level case-mix
management capability is determined and the expected cost savings
specified, the cost/benefit of implementing DRGs remains an open
question.
In addition to concerns with the cost/benefit tradeoff of
adopting DRGs, the Congress should be aware of our concern over the
implementation dates in the statutory language. It does not appear
feasible to implement fully a DRG allocation model by 1 October
1987. Problems with the quality of the diagnoses and procedure
coding and differences int he availability of financial data among
the Services present significant obstacles to creating a compre-
hensive inpatient resource allocation model. Therefore, a phased
implementation approach appears more prudent.
This report discusses the major system changes envisioned if
DRGs are to be used as the primary criteria for allocating
inpatient resources. Section II presents background information on
the resource allocation process and MTF management system in terms
of the present structural constraints to implementing DRGS; Section
III discusses a proposed phased implementation plan; and Section IV
deals with issues related to the unprogrammed funding for this
requirement and the difficulty anticipated with developing
diagnosis related groups for outpatient services.
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II. BACKGROUND
Before describing our approach to implementing a DRG based
allocation system, we would like to describe unique aspects of the
MHSS which must be considered in adopting a civilian reimbursement
system. Unlike the civilian health care arena, the major mission
of the MHSS is to maintain medical readiness for wartime. Wartime
demands, which are paramount, may conflict with peacetime health
care considerations. As a result, decisions to support medical
readiness may not appear to be cost effective when viewed purely in
terms of civilian health care economics. Although Congress has
excluded medical readiness requirements from allocation using DRGs,
the current MHSS financial and information systems do not clearly
distinguish between resources consumed by readiness demands and
those consumed by peacetime requirements. In fact, the portion of
hospital resources that are consumed by readiness related ac-
tivities is largely speculative and, depending on how one wants to
define readiness, could range from a very small portion of direct
care funds to all funds spent in the direct care system. In
addition, each medical department responds differently to its
unique service specific mission requirements for mobilization and
readiness. As a result, there exists a very different mix of
military and civilian staff across Services and even within each
Service depending upon the location of the MTF. All of these
disparities complicate efforts to develop a uniform allocation
system which is responsive to the unique medical readiness needs of
each medical department.
Another unique aspect of the MHSS is the budgeting and
appropriations process. Within this process are several con-
straints which may limit the potential effectiveness of a DRG based
system. For instance, MTFs are supported by several appropriations
and categories of funding many of which, such as military salaries
and military construction, are controlled by program managers other
than the Service medical departments. funds may not be spent for
other than the purpose appropriated. For instance, funds ap-
propriated for military salaries may not be used to purchase
equipment or to hire civilian personnel nor may "procurement" funds
be used to contract for commercial services. MTF commanders lack
the flexibility to shift resources among appropriations in order to
reduce costs or improve the quality of care. Since, in general,
only the operations and maintenance appropriation can be regulated
by MTF commanders, substantial resources remain outside their
control
.
The financial accounting systems of the three Services present
another major hurdle. The medical departments obtain their
accounting support from their respective Services which have
independently designed each system. None of the current financial
structures are capable of providing the level of detail necessary
to facilitate DRG cost analysis. In order to respond appropriately
to the productivity incentives inherent within a DRG allocation
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model, a MTF commander must be able to manage the cost per patient
case within a DRG. A case management strategy requires a high
degree of sophistication in adjusting for differences among patient
severity, provider practice patterns, MTF management of the case,
and the quality with which the care was delivered. Case management
also requires the integration of extensive clinical, management,
and financial data files and the development of a patient level
cost accounting system to ensure that case productivities are
compared in an appropriate fashion. The developed systems must be
uniform, decentralized and detailed enough to support case mix
management.
Finally, the civilian DRG based reimbursement system varies
significantly form the current federal allocation process for
distributing funds through agencies to activities. Three key
differences are evident. First, the Prospective Payment System
(PPS) reimburses hospitals for care provided to patients in
specific DRGs based on the average cost of providing that care.
Under a resource allocation system, the military distributes a
fixed budget to facilities based on the ratio of each hospital's
workload to the total workload. The actual cost of providing care
to individual patients is not considered.
Second, there is a major difference in the ability of the MHSS
to respond to incentives. Under PPS, hospitals can improve their
profitability by taking specific management actions to reduce the
costs associated with care in a particular DRG and are able to keep
the difference as profit. In an open, competitive reimbursement
system, the savings retained by one hospital are not affected by
the losses incurred at another hospital. In a closed budget
system, an increase in funds for one hospital is most often offset
by a decrement to another.
Third, within PPS each civilian hospital functions inde-
pendently and has the option of developing or acquiring software
packages to enhance utilization review and to manage clinical and
financial data based on DRGs. Within the MHSS there is a require-
ment to allocate and manage resources across a multi-hospital
system. Consequently, the need for coordination and centralized
funding slows the response time for delivering systems support to
our MTFs when compared to individual civilian hospitals. In
responding to the new requirement for MTF level case mix manage-
ment, the Defense Medical Systems Support Center (DMSSC) has
already undertaken several initiatives to enhance current informa-
tion system capabilities.
In summary, the use of DRGs will offer a variety of management
benefits, such as the ability to evaluate provider and management
practices using length of stay and cost per case. Yet, the real
benefit of a prospective DRG system lies in the ability of the MTF
commander to control and manage individual patient costs while
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responding to incentives for efficiency and quality care. To take
advantage of these incentive, the following must be addressed:
improve definitions of medical readiness and peace-time resour-
ces; investigate increased management flexibility within the
appropriations process; move towards a patient level cost
accounting system; and recognize the differences between a
civilian and MHSS environment which limit full application of a
DRG prospective reimbursement model.
III. PLAN FOR THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES USING DRGs
In order to provide a balance between resource allocation and
MTF management enhancement, a phased approach for implementing the
DRG legislation is planned. During the sort term, which includes
fiscal years 1988 and 1989, the Services' databases will be refined
and integrated, MTF level management software will be developed,
and a resource allocation simulation model will be created for
testing policy decisions. As far as actual resource shifts, FY
1988 will be a neutral year with limited allocation by the Services
to begin in FY 1989. In the midterm phase, FY 1990 through FY
1991, full resource distribution decisions based on the DRG
allocation methodology will be made by the Services. During the
long term phase, FY 1992 and beyond, the availability of the
Composite Health Care System (CHCS) will allow the MTF to link
specific resource management capability at the hospital level.
It should be emphasized that a phased approach is not without
precedent. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)
minimized the impact of DRGs in the early years by limiting the
reimbursable categories, excluding certain types of care, and
initiating an incremental approach for reimbursement per DRG by
specifying a regional and national blend which was phased in over a
four year period. The irrefutable value of a planned and tested
resource allocation model argues for a phased approach. The
activities to be accomplished during the three phases are discussed
in further detail.
A. Short Term Phase - FY 1988 - 1989
1.0 Activities During FY 1988
1.1 Develop Integrated Data - During this year inconsis-
tencies in the way the three Services handle and report inpatient
biometrics data will be addressed. Biostatistical issues regarding
the length of time to close-out inpatient records, the quality of
the diagnosis and procedure coding, and how DRG reporting will be
handled at the MTF level and the Service s financial systems to
separate out costs associated with direct health care as well as
the costs that should be explicitly excluded from resource
allocation based on DRGs. A program to integrate the Services'
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financial/ Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System
(MEPRS) , and biostatistical data will be designed.
1.2 Develop Resource Allocation and Simulation Model-
Development of a DRG-based allocation model involves major policy
decisions that affect the design, scope, and eventual impact of the
allocation system. These include computing DRG relative weights,
selecting an approach to hospital grouping, excluding certain DRGs,
determining the amount of resources to be allocated, and combining
inpatient and outpatient allocation models.
In developing the allocation model, computation of relative
DRG weights for the military is a crucial step. Initially, the
inpatient weight for each disposition will be based on 1987 HCFA
DRG weights refined using MEPRS data to reflect total distributed
costs of operation. During FY 1988 an attempt will be made to
develop DoD unique weights. Part of this analysis will include
comparing DoD patient demographics and DRG distributions with data
from state, CHAMPUS, AND MEDICAID payers in order to evaluate the
reasonableness of DoD weights.
A set of peer groups for DoD medical facilities will be
established to account for differences in cost per DRG attributable
to facility uniqueness. Variables to be considered in the
development of these peer groups include catchment area population
characteristics, MTF condition, MTF size, location (geographical),
teaching status, major mission differences, and workload mix
differences (inpatient versus outpatient).
The experience of the civilian community has demonstrated
that certain facilities, case types and costs are difficult to
classify and should appropriately be excluded. Psychiatric,
alcohol rehabilitation, and drug detoxification cases and capital
and medical costs are examples. Decisions on exclusions will be
made based on an analysis of the Services' data sets as well as
constraints within the budget and appropriations process.
Alternative allocation strategies will be developed for those costs
or case types excluded from the standard methodology.
For unusually expensive cases, as well as for short-stay
low cost cases, workload credit will be given on an adjusted per
diem basis rather than assigning the standard weight for the
disposition. An adjustment must also be determined for transfers
between military medical treatment facilities and for active duty
personnel being retained as inpatients due to medical separations.
The amount of resources to be allocated based on inpatient
DRGs will be identified by a financial steering group composed of
representatives from each of the Services and OASD (HA) . Due to
the current appropriations process, the inability of information
systems to support case management, and the limited management
flexibility at the MTF level, the initial scope of resources to be
allocated will be relatively small. Regardless of the amount
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initially allocated, the total cost of direct health care at a
facility will require significant changes to the existing informa-
tion systems before relevant data is readily available.
Since the current allocation and appropriations process
does not separate inpatient from outpatient direct care, the
workload and cost of ambulatory care must be included in an overall
allocation model. While the inpatient portion will be based on a
prospective DRG-based allocation scheme, the outpatient allocation
will remain on a retrospective cost basis until an ambulatory visit
group (AVG) methodology can be developed.
During development of the allocation methodology, a
resource simulation model will be created to explore the financial
impact of alternative policy decisions. The resource allocation
effects resulting from decisions concerning the appropriate outlier
values; workload credit given for zero bed day admissions; and
credit for ambulatory surgery and transfers between facilities can
be made by testing different scenarios. This model is essential
since it provides a mechanism for identifying the effects of policy
decisions that may have unintended and inappropriate adverse
resource impacts.
1.3 Develop MTF Level Management Systems - In order to
facilitate case management within the MTF, automated systems must
be designed to support productivity and financial variance
analyses. Ultimately, the system should merge clinical and
financial data, link specific resource use with the individual
patient, and support multiple users of the data. During FY 1988
DRG management software and related "tools" will be developed
and/or procured to support MTF level decision making. The proposed
case mix system contains five modules which are considered
essential for the implementation of a DRG based allocation and
management system.
A precertif ication module will provide the capability for
the admission DRG to be screened against DoD, Service, or MTF
criteria before the admission is authorized. Emphasis is on the
inappropriate admission which, if prevented, will enhance both
quality and cost effective care. Complete and sophisticated
precertif ication also provides the capability to satisfy the
majority of third party insurance payers.
An encoder module will be added to improve the coding
process. The accuracy of the diagnoses and procedure coding
affects the DRG assignment which in turn determines the amount of
budget allocation. DoD MTFs presently do not possess the number
and necessary skill mix of clinical record administrators or
technicians to accurately and reliably code the medical record.
While not a substitute for skilled personnel, a protocol driven
encoder will provide disease process logic to assist in the
appropriate coding of diagnoses and procedures. Even with an
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encoder, the need for significant salary increases for clinical
records personnel must be addressed.
Automated support in the form of a DRG Grouper is required
to group patients into the appropriate DRG based upon diagnoses,
procedures, age, sex and comorbidities/complications. The Grouper
will allow on-line DRG assignment and will support DoD unique
weights and codes.
To aid in the concurrent management of the patient case, an
automated system will be provided. This Utilization Review
"Tickler" reminds the provider staff that the patient is approach-
ing the selected length of stay percentile for a specific DRG and,
unless a discharge is not medically warranted, the patient's
discharge may be anticipated.
To allow MTF personnel to examine variations in case
productivity and to direct appropriate action while maintaining the
quality of patient care, a retrospective case review module will be
developed. This capability to conduct sophisticated case-mix
analyses is vital for identifying management opportunities to
reduce costs and to promote quality care.
1.4 Provide Service Guidance - DoD recognizes that the
allocation of resources to the medical treatment facility level
must be performed by the Services, During FY 1988, guidance will
be provided to the Services to establish a uniform medical resource
allocation methodology and to develop a case-mix management
capability within the MTFs. Standard and optional reports will be
developed through a series of work groups, meeting with profes-
sional and management specialists, and contracts with professional
review organizations in order to draw on the experience of the
civilian community. Emphasis will be on the creation of a bottom
up reporting structure which is responsive to the needs of facility
managers wile stressing the relevant aspects of efficiency and
effectiveness in the provision of health care. In addition, OASD
(HA) will initiate actions required to develop and deploy the
standard automated systems necessary for the Services to implement
the DRG resource allocation and management models. The Services
ill be required to implement the standard systems and to develop
and submit a resource allocation implementation plan consistent
with the guidance and milestones promulgated by OASD (HA)
.
2.0 Activities During FY 1989
2.1 Develop Integrated Data - The definition and integra-
tion of biometrics and financial data within and among the Services
will continue.
2.2 Implement Resource Allocation Model - The Services
will begin to allocate resources based on the model developed
during the simulation in FY 1988. Based on OASD (HA) guidance, the
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2.3 Develop MTF Level Management Systems - The prolifera-
tion of the case-mix software will continue. By the end of FY
1989, all inpatient facilities will have the software installed.
B. Midterm Phase FY 1990-1991
The midterm phase will be one of growth and maturation. During
this phase, five principal events are expected to occur.
— First, the categories of resources allocated under inpatient
DRGs and the outpatient measure will be expanded to the
feasible limit allowed by the budget and appropriations
process
;
-- Second, the financial systems will be adjusted to meet the
increased demand for a patient oriented costing system. As it
may be too costly to modify the Service's accounting systems to
support case-mix management at the patient level, developing or
purchasing a patient level cost accounting module may be
desirable and will be explored;
-- Third, there will be increased emphasis on the identifica-
tion of mobilization and readiness related activities and their
impact on patient care and MTFs;
-- Fourth, information and decision support systems and other
management tools not presently available will evolve.
Performance reporting will become refined through the use of
standard and ad hoc report capabilities appropriate for each
level of the organization;
-- Finally, the sophistication of the case mix management
capability will be increased by adding a patient severity
index, introducing more complex resource utilization data with
the availability of CHCS, and developing strategies for
ambulatory case management.
C. Long Term Phase FY 1992 and Beyond
The extent to which the DRG allocation process can be imple-
mented will be constrained by the current appropriations and
allocation process, the present Service financial accounting
structures, and differences among the Service medical departments.
During this phase the feasibility of a single appropriation or
granting authority to move funds between appropriations will be
evaluated as avenues to expand the resource allocation scope.
Increased emphasis will be placed on identifying and resolving





Implementation of a DRG resource allocation system will be
costly. Additional funds, as yet unprogrammed, will be necessary
for personnel increases, training programs, and enhancements to
current information systems. These three areas are critical to
development and implementation of a DRG allocation and management
system.
It is anticipated that OASD (HA) and the Service head-
quarters will require additional personnel to evaluate the DRG data
for trend analysis and rate construction, resource forecasting,
access/quality of service analysis, and impact on the beneficiary
population. Based on the experience of states that have imple-
mented DRG systems, six staff roles will become crucial: hospital
accountant, senior analyst programmer, statistician, hospital/
health policy specialist, professional in medical record coding and
technology, and professional involved in active utilization review.
At the MTF level, skilled personnel to code clinical records, to
coordinate the DRG project, and to analyze the data will be
required for effective implementation of the case mix management
system.
For all MHSS personnel structured training sessions will be
required for successful implementation and transition of the DRG
incentives to obtain improvements in productivity within the MTFs.
This requirement for training is compounded by the complexity of
the management and allocation models and the extent to which it
will effect all administrative and clinical areas. An intense
short term training effort will be required initially to prepare
the MTFs for the project. Additional training will occur as the
phased expansion of the resource allocation process develops. DRG
information should be added to all of the Services structured
training sessions.
Lastly, before a patient case-mix management system is
possible, procurement of clinical management software and extensive
changes to the current financial systems are required. While the
foundations of the existing automated systems can be used, the
hardware and software requirements to support allocation of
resources using DRGs far exceeds existing capabilities. At
present, the extent to which additional hardware will be necessary
is unknown.
2.0 DRGs for Outpatient Services
Unlike the model available for the inpatient setting, there
is no nationally accepted methodology for classification of
ambulatory workload. The Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) has made this a top research priority and has funded several
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projects in an effort to quantify resource consumption in am-
bulatory care. The major projects include: Ambulatory Visit
Groups (AVGs)
, being developed by Health Systems Management Group,
Yale University; Patient Management Categories (PMCs) being
developed by Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania; Emergency
Department Groupings (EDGs) being developed by UCLA; and Products
of Ambulatory Care (PACs) being developed under contract by the New
York Health Department. In addition, an attempt is being made by
the Subcomittee on Statistical Aspects of Physician Payment
Systems, National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, to
refine and widely implement a Uniform Ambulatory Medical Care
Minimum Data Set (UAMCMDS) . No approach is emerging as a front-
runner. More importantly, each project has identified the real
dearth of sufficient and reliable outpatient visit data from which
to develop a useful classification system and the uniform lack of
automated data collection systems.
Within DoD there exists a parallel problem in capturing
patient level ambulatory care data. If we interpret the legisla-
tion as requiring detailed (diangosis) and treatment specific)
patient level classification of workload, there does not exist
within DoD a capability to capture this data. Without this data
collection capability and a tested, accepted AVG methodology, the
MHSS cannot anticipate being able to establish diagnosis related
groups for outpatient services soon after September 30, 1988.
Currently, plans for FY 1989 center on selecting patient types,
services, or procedures which require separate accounting and/or
unique workload credits based on the Army's ambulatory care data
base pilot study. Additional sophistication in ambulatory
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